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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAVID VANCE GROVIER

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No* 890583-CA

Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
defendant's motion to suppress evidence entered on June 19, 1990
in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah.

On July 11, 1990, this Court granted defendant's

petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling
that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his
vehicle.

Because of the trial court's advantageous position in

determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress, this
Court will not reverse the trial court's factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.

State v. Johnson, 771

P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,
1989).

P.2d

(Utah

However, in assessing the trial court's legal conclusions

based upon its factual findings, this Court applies a correction
of error standard.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S.

Const. Amend. IV i
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David Vance Grovier, was charged with

possession of a controlled substance, to wit, 124.8 grams of
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 21).

In a

pretrial motion, defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine
(R. at 101). Both parties submitted memorandum and an
evidentiary hearing was held (R. at 70-85, 104-120, 130). The
trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion
(R. at 134-135, 144-154, 162-163, Findings and Order).

Defendant

then sought and was granted permission to file an interlocutory
appeal (R. at 156, 157).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 23, 1990, at approximately 10:30 a.m.,
officer Lynn Davis of Cedar City Police Department received a
message to call one of his confidential informants (T. at 35).
The informant, who Davis had previously relied upon approximately
10-15 times, gave the license plate number of a green 1973 Buick
Riviera and told Davis that he believed there was "crank"
(methamphetamine) in the car (T. at 35, 48). According to the
informant, the man and woman driving the car were on their way
-2-

out of town and had last been seen on south main street (R. at
35).

Davis relayed the information to Chief of Police, Peter J.

Hansen, telling Hansen that his source was a reliable
confidential informant (T. at 8, 35, 48).
Hansen and officer Kelvin Orton spotted a green Riviera
matching Davis's description at the Stars Market in south Cedar
City at approximately 11:10 a.m. and followed it north down Main
Street for approximately five minutes before Hansen, who was not
wearing a uniform, requested Sergeant Dennis Anderson, who was
then on patrol in a marked police car, to stop the Riviera as it
approached the Iron County Correctional Facility (T. at 9, 9394).

Upon being stopped, defendant got out of his car and asked

why he had been pulled over (T. at 95).

Anderson told defendant

that "a citizen had possibly seen him smoking marijuana," to
which defendant replied, "I don't have anything, go ahead and
search" (T. at 56-58, 68-69, 95).

Anderson then asked, "Can

we?" to which defendant responded, "Yes" (T. at 95).

Anderson

then explained that additional officers were on the way to help
and defendant again stated, "I don't have anything in the car.
Go ahead and search it" (T. at 95-96).
Hansen and Orton arrived shortly after Anderson stopped
defendant.

Orton performed a brief search of the female

passenger, Petie Ray Hale, during which a fannypack Hale had
strapped around her waist was removed and searched by Hansen who
discovered a marijuana pipe and other paraphernalia inside (T. at

Sergeant Anderson assumed this was the basis for the stop
without seeking clarification from Chief Hansen (T. at 95).
-3-

10).

Hale was then placed under arrest and seated in Anderson's

patrol car (T. 96).
While Hale was being arrested, Hansen approached
defendant who was standing by Anderson's patrol car and informed
him that he wanted to search for drugs, to which defendant
replied, "go ahead and look" (T. at 11).

Hansen then advised

defendant of his Miranda rights but did not formally arrest him
(T. at 11; Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, March 19, 1990
[hereinafter P.H.] at 19). After advising defendant of his
rights, Hansen asked if defendant's consent to search included
the "trunk, passenger area, and motor compartment," to which
defendant responded, "Yes" (T. at 11-12, 23-24, 26-27).

Several

officers then began a search of defendant's vehicle which lasted
approximately 20 minutes, during which time no controlled
substances were found (T. at 10; P.H. at 40).
Hansen then approached defendant a second time, telling
him he believed that there were drugs in the car, and asked
defendant if he would tell him where to find them (T. at 13-14).
Defendant became somewhat agitated at this point and responded,
"Give me a break, Chief.

Come on.

There's nothing there.

You

guys are picking on me. . . . There ought to be a law against
people looking in people's cars like this" (T. at 25-26).

Hansen

then informed defendant that he intended "to remove the car from
the street into the sally port of the correctional facility and
dismantle the car bolt by bolt if necessary," to which defendant
replied, "Go for it" (T. at 14-15, 28-31).

Defendant was then

handcuffed and he, along with the vehicle and codefendant Hale,

_A_

were transported to the correctional facility, approximately 200
yards from the initial stop (T. at 15, 96, 100; R. at 149).
Defendant stated that he did not want his car "torn apart," and
that "[tjhere ought to be a law against searching," while riding
in the back of Anderson's patrol car on the way to the
correctional facility (T. at 96-97).

Once at the facility,

defendant, who was not formally charged at this time, was seated
in an interview room inside the pre-admissions area while the
search was continued (T. at 15-17, 50-51; P.H. at 43).

While

there, defendant requested to speak with Hansen and informed him
that he did not have permission to dismantle the car (T. at 17,
50-51).

Hansen then instructed the officers conducting the

search not to dismantle defendant's car (T. at 17-18).

Defendant

was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained while he was searched
by correctional officer, Gary Bulloch, to whom defendant stated,
"They better not fuckin' tear it apart" (T. at 50-52).
When the suspected drugs were not discovered after a
cursory search, Hansen left the sally port to try and obtain a
warrant to dismantle the car (T. at 17).

Hansen turned the

search over to Davis, before leaving the area at approximately
12:30 p.m., and told Davis that he had noticed a strange odor
coming from the driver's seat area of the car (T. at 17, 20).
Davis also noticed a "chemical-type smell" around the driver's
seat which he believed to be methamphetamine and began his search
of defendant's vehicle in that general area (T. at 38). When he
did not find anything in or around the seat, Davis looked under
the dash with a flashlight (T. at 41-43).

-5-

To see better, Davis

attempted to move an undamped heater hose aside and acciaentaiiy
disconnected it (T. at 41-43, 45-46).

When Davis shined his

flashlight inside the hose he noticed something stuffed inside
(T. 42-44).

Reaching inside to pull it out, Davis discovered a

gray cloth wrapped around a ziplock baggy containing
methamphetamine (T. at 19, 44). Hansen, who had not yet obtained
a warrant, returned to the sally port at approximately 1:00 p.m.,
just as Davis emerged from defendant's car with the
methamphetamine (T. at 19).
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the
methamphetamine seized, the trial court made specific findings of
fact that (1) defendant voluntarily consented to the search of
his vehicle; (2) the scope of the search did not exceed the
limits of defendant's consent; (3) defendant at no time withdrew
his consent to search; and (4) that if defendant had withdrawn
his consent, Hansen would have called off the search immediately
(T. at 104-106, district court's oral findings at the suppression
hearing June 19, 1990; R. at 144-54, a copy of the district
court's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is
attached hereto as Addendum A ) .
Other evidence will be discussed in the body of this
brief, as pertinent to the specific arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress because there was reasonable suspicion for the stop of
defendant's vehicle and defendant knowingly and voluntarily
consented to the search of his vehicle. Although defendant

-6-

subsequently limited the scope of his consent when he instructed
police not to dismantle his car, he at no time expressly revoked
his consent to search and the scope of the search never exceeded
the limits of defendant's consent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY POLICE
BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE WAS BASED ON A REASONABLE AND
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS
INVOLVED IN A CRIME AND DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY
CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence.

In reviewing the trial court's

ruling, this Court applies the following standard:
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. .
. . The trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
"correction of error" standard.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

In points I and II of his brief, defendant disputes the
trial court's finding that the State had probable cause to stop
and seize his vehicle (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of
App.] at 10-14).

However, the trial court did not need to find

probable cause for the stop of defendant's vehicle because the
stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion that defendant was

-7-

involved in criminal activity.

That reasonable suspicion,

together with defendant's subsequent voluntary consent to search,
provided a sufficient basis for the investigatory stop, search
and subsequent arrest of defendant.
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic
regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d
880, 883 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv.
Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

A stop of a vehicle is, of course, also justified when

the officer has probable cause to believe either the vehicle or
This Court has previously noted that there are three
constitutionally permissible levels of police stops:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-618 (Utah 1987) (Utah Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning in United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986)).
-8-

an occupant has violated the law.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

at 661, 663.
The "reasonable suspicion" test was rirst articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

There the Court held that when "a police officer

observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his
suspicion.

Jd. at 30. A police officer who makes an

investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."

JEd. at 21.

The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows:
Any peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal
activity.'"

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (citations omitted).

These standards apply when a "Terry

stop" is made in reliance on a bulletin issued by other police
officers.
[If] a flyer or bulletin has been issuea un
the basis of articulable facts supporting a
reasonable suspicion that the wanted person
has committed an offense, then reliance on
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to
-9-

check identification, to pose questions to
the person, or to detain the person briefly
while attempting to obtain further
information.
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989) (quoting United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)).
The stop of defendant's vehicle was based on a tip from
a confidential informant who had observed drugs in defendant's
car (R. at 146). Although defendant argues that the tip was
insufficient to establish probable cause to stop and arrest him,
he appears to concede that the tip constituted reasonable
suspicion to support an investigatory stop of his vehicle (Br. of
App. at 11-12).

Reasonable suspicion may be based on an

informant's tip as long as it is sufficiently reliable.
v. White,

U.S.

Alabama

, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2414-2415 (1990); Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972)).

See United States v.

Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted).

The United States Supreme Court noted in Alabama v.

White that the "totality of the circumstances" test for
determining probable cause was "also relevant in the reasonable
suspicion context, although allowance must be made in applying
[it] for the lesser showing required to meet that standard."
at 2415.
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause not only in the
sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is
different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause, but
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable
cause. Adams v. Williams, supra,
demonstrates as much. We there assumed that
-10-

Id.

the unverified tip from the known informant
might not have been reliable enough to
establish probable cause, but nevertheless
found it sufficiently reliable to justify a
Terry stop. 407 U.S., at 147, 92 S.Ct., at
1923-24. Reasonable suspicion, like probable
cause, is dependent upon both the content of
the information possessed by police and its
degree of reliability. Both factors quantity and quality - are considered in the
11
totality of the circumstances - the whole
picture," United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981), that must be taken into account when
evaluating whether there is reasonable
suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively
low degree of reliability, more information
will be required to establish the requisite
quantum of suspicion than would be required
if the tip were more reliable.
Id. at 2416.
Unlike the anonymous tip in Alabama v. White,

3

the

informant in this case was known to Officer Davis and had
previously tipped him approximately 10-15 times (T. at 35, 48).
The morning of February 23, 1990, the informant tipped Davis
again, informing him that he had observed "crank" (a tan powdery
substance) in an older, green Buick Riviera being driven by a man
and woman (R. at 146; T. at 36). The informant gave the car's
license plate number and stated that he had last seen it at the
The investigatory stop analyzed in Alabama v. White was made
pursuant to an anonymous telephone tip that White would be
leaving a particular apartment at a particular time in a
particular vehicle, that she would be going to a particular
motel, and that she would be in possession of cocaine. The
police immediately proceeded to the apartment building, saw a
vehicle matching the caller's description, observed White as she
left the building and entered the vehicle, and followed her along
the most direct route to the motel, stopping her vehicle just
short of the motel. Even though the tipster was anonymous, under
a totality of the circumstances, the Court held that the tip had
been sufficiently corroborated by the time the officers stopped
White to furnish reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in
criminal activity. Jd. at 2416.
-i i -

south end of Main Street in Cedar City (R. at 146; T. at 36),
The informant also told Davis that he believed the occupants of
the green Riviera were on their way out of town (T. at 36).
Based on this information, defendant's vehicle was stopped on
north Main Street, in front of the Iron County Correctional
Facility, a short while later (T. at 7).
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 23 (1972), as in this
case, the tipster was not anonymous, but rather, a reliable
confidential informant.

The officer in Adams v. Williams acted

on information, supplied moments earlier by an informant known to
him, that Williams was sitting in a nearby vehicle carrying a
4
weapon and narcotics.
After talking to the informant, the
officer approached the vehicle and asked Williams to open his car
5
door.
Williams lowered the window and the officer reached into
the car and found a loaded handgun in Williams waistband.

On

appeal, Williams claimed the seizure of his pistol was not
justified "absent a more reliable informant, or some
corroboration of the tip." Iji. at 145. The United States Supreme
Court disagreed.

Noting that "this is a stronger case than

obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip," the Court
held that "the information carried enough indicia of reliability
to justify the forcible stop of Williams," where:

(1) "[t]he

The informant apparently gave no indication as to how he had
obtained this information.
5
Although Williams's vehicle was not in motion prior to the
encounter, the Court appeared to assume a seizure had occurred
for fourth amendment purposes prior to the search for the weapon,
as it was not contended that Williams acted voluntarily in
rolling down the window of his car. Id. at 146 n.l.
-12-

informant was known to him personally and (2) had provided him
with information in the past."

^d. at 146.

In reaching this conclusion, we reject
[Williams'] argument that reasonable cause
for a stop and frisk can only be based on the
officer's personal observation, rather than
on information supplied by another person.
Informants' tips, like all other clues and
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene,
may vary greatly in their value and
reliability. One simple rule will not cover
every situation. Some tips, completely
lacking in indicia of reliability, would
either warrant no police response or require
further investigation before a forcible stop
of a suspect would be authorized. But in
some situations - for example, when the
victim of a street crime seeks immediate
police aid and gives a description of his
assailant, or when a credible informant warns
of a specific impending crime - the
subtleties of the hearsay rule should not
thwart an appropriate police response.
Id. at 147.

See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 683 (informant's wealth of

detail concerning the robbery, coupled with her admission of
tangential participation in the robbery, established informant's
reliability and aroused a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity).
Several courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, have applied Adams v. Williams, in finding the requisite
"indicia of reliability" in an informant's tip.

See, e.g.,

United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 504, 507 (10th Cir. 1990)
(confidential informant's tip bore sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify investigatory stop where informant had
provided information in the past, was characterized as "reliable
citizen-type," and provided detailed information concerning
manner in which vehicle was regularly used to transport
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marijuana);

Thompson, 906 F.2d at 1295-96 (fact that car

stopped was not exact color described by reliable informant and
carried different license plates did not destroy officer's
reasonable suspicion that vehicle he observed was same vehicle
described in all points bulletin); Commonwealth v. Smith,
Super,

Pa.

, 577 A.2d 1387, 1391-92 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1990)

(sufficient basis existed for investigatory stop where reliable
informant described defendant, stating he had just observed him
selling cocaine in a specific location and defendant began acting
suspiciously as soon as he perceived presence of police); Kaiser
v. State, 24 Ark. App. 19, 746 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Ark. Ct. App.)
(where police considered confidential informant reliable, they
had reasonable suspicion for stop when the described vehicle,
bearing the predicted license plate, appeared in the described
area, within the predicted period of time), rev'd, 296 Ark. 125,
752 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Ark. 1988) (reversed and remanded on the
ground that record was devoid of testimony concerning informant's
reliability).

Cf. State v. Bullington,

Ariz.

, 795 P.2d

1294, 1296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (failing to cite Adams v.
Williams, or otherwise analyze the informant's reliability, court
attempts to distinguish Alabama v. White to reach conclusion that
police lacked reasonable suspicion to make investigatory stop of
van, even though it matched the informant's description because
informant failed to give any details as to future actions of

The Gonzales informant did not personally observe drugs in
defendant's rented car, but had personal knowledge that Gonzales
rented the car for the express purpose of transporting and
distributing drugs.
-14-

suspects and nothing occurred prior to stop except for erratic
7
driving and several stops).
Based on the above analysis, tip
from the confidential informant constituted at least reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle under
the fourth amendment.
Upon being stopped, defendant voluntarily consented to
a search of his vehicle.

As the Supreme Court said in

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), it is "well
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to
the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search

Relying on its own case law and state statutes, the Supreme
Court of Louisana has applied a similar approach to that in Adams
v. Williams for determining the reliability of an informant's
tip:
We hold the officer's in this case conducted
a valid investigatory stop. The reasonable
suspicion required by article 215.1 is
predicated upon the past reliability of the
informant, verification by the officers of
all specific items of supporting information,
and the rational inferences to be drawn from
information in such detail that only one with
actual knowledge could provide it.
State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312, 1315 (La. 1981) (where
reliable informant gave the location, make, color and license
plate number of defendant's vehicle, as well as the time of its
arrival and a description of the occupants, court found
reasonable suspicion to justify valid investigatory stop was
established after officers located vehicle fitting informant's
description in the described area at the predicted time). See
State v. Commodore, 418 So.2d 1330, 1332-33 (La. 1982) (where
previous information received from informant had resulted in
approximately ten to fifteen narcotics convictions, officers had
reasonable cause to conduct investigatory stop after they
observed car fitting informant's description, driven by
individual named by informant and headed in direction informant
had indicated). See also State v. Geraci, 518 So.2d 554, 561
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (court may require corroboration by
independent sources where the reliability of the informant is not
satisfactorily demonstrated).
-15-

that is conducted pursuant to [valid] consent."
(citations omitted).

Jd. at 219

For consent to be valid it must be freely

and voluntarily given.

I_d. at 222. This Court has likewise

recognized the voluntary consent exception to fourth amendment
requirements.

See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App.

1990); Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887.
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).

See also State v. Arroyo, 796

To determine whether consent to search was

voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test is applied to
ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not the result
of "duress or coercion, express or implied."

Marshall, 791 P.2d

at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The issue of
whether a defendant voluntarily consented is a question of fact
on which the state carries the burden of proof.

United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
222, 227.

See also Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. This Court

deferentially reviews the trial court's finding that defendant's
consent was voluntarily given and will not reverse absent clear
error.

Id.
While this Court has made clear that the state has the

burden of demonstrating voluntary consent, it has not clearly
specified what standard of proof applies to that burden.

In

Webb, 790 P.2d at 82, and Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-88, the Court
appears to have adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof
by embracing the standard espoused in United States v. Abbott,
546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976).

Quoting Abbott, the Webb Court

set out the following standard which must be met by the State "to
sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent was given:"
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(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given"; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumpion against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived.
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d 885 (quoting
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)).
This standard has been questioned by at least one other court as
being an unduly strict standard of proof.

United States v.

Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440
U.S. 958 (1979).

Indeed, insofar as the Abbott standard imposes

a clear and convincing standard of proof on the government, it is
contrary to the clear majority view that the government need only
prove voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the
evidence.

See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177

n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent
to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling burden
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for the
principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Hurtado,
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d
377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company v. United States,
903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 557 N.E.2d 1277
(111. App. 1990); State v. Cross, 576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990); State
v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220
Cal.App.3d 1632, 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 (1990).
-17-

While acceptance of the preponderance standard in this
context is not universal, see 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure,
§ 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has
made clear that that standard is appropriate, thus explaining the
majority view.

As the Fifth Circuit said in overruling its prior

decisions that adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof:
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated
that the preponderance of evidence standard
supplies the burden which the government must
carry to defeat a defendant's motion to
suppress evidence when the motion concerns
the voluntariness of a confession, Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.Ct. 619,
623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the
voluntariness of a consent to a warrantless
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda
rights, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
In conformity with the rationale announced
by the Supreme Court, we overrule our
previous decisions requiring the government
at a suppression hearing to prove
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear
and convincing evidence. ,f[T]he controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings
should impose no greater burden than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence." United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14,
94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242
(1974) .
United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d at 76.

In Lego v. Twomey, the

Supreme Court explained its rationale for the preponderance
standard:
Since the purpose that a voluntariness
hearing is designed to serve has nothing
whatever to do with improving the reliability
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge
that judging the admissibility of a
-18-

confession by a preponderance of the evidence
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not
concerned with the standards for determining
the admissibility of evidence or with the
prosecution's burden of proof at a
suppression hearing when evidence is
challenged on constitutional grounds.
Winship went no further than to confirm the
fundamental right that protects "the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is
charged." Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1072. . •
. A guilty verdict is not rendered less
reliable or less consonant with Winship
simply because the admissibility of a
confession is determined by a less stringent
standard. . . .
404 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also rejected the argument that
the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof
in order to protect the values that exclusionary rules are
designed to protect:
The argument is straightforward and has
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely
emphasizing the importance of the values
served by exclusionary rules is itself
sufficient demonstration that the
Constitution also requires admissibility to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been excluded from federal
criminal trials for years. The same is true
of coerced confessions offered in federal or
state trials. But, from our experience over
this period of time no substantial evidence
has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered from determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without
good cause, we are unwilling to expand
currently applicable exclusionary rules by
erecting additional barriers to placing
truthful and probative evidence before state
juries . . . .
Sound reason for moving
further in this direction has not been
offered here nor do we discern any at the
-19-

present time. This is particularly true
since the exclusionary rules are very much
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the
police and prosecution and it is very
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment
suppression hearings would be sufficiently
productive in this respect to outweigh the
public interest in placing probative evidence
before juries for the purpose of arriving at
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.
404 U.S. at 488-89 (citations and footnote omitted).

Although

the Court said that "the States are free, pursuant to their own
law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in that] [t]hey may indeed
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find
at stake," Id. at 489, the rationale of Lego v. Twomey is sound
and should provide the basis for this Court clearly specifying
that the state need only prove voluntary consent to search by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Defendant claims his consent could not have been
voluntary because it was coerced and "not specific and
unequivocal" (Br. of App. at 17, 19). Defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to the initial search of his car upon being
stopped (T. at 11-12, 23-27, 56-58, 68-69, 95-96) and does not
appear to dispute the validity or scope of his initial consent to
search; rather, defendant focuses his argument on the validity
and scope of his consent to conduct a second, more extensive
search of his car in the sally port of the correctional facility
(Br. of App. at 17-18).
Defendant asserts his consent was coerced because (1)
he was not made aware of his right to refuse consent to search
which consituted an illegal act on the part of police, and (2) he
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was not free to leave (Br. of App. at 17, point I; 21-22, point
o

V).

Defendant's contentions are erroneous.

Failure to inform

suspects of their right to refuse consent is not an illegal act;
rather, a suspects knowledge of the right to refuse consent is
merely one factor to be considered under the totality of the
circumstances.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. The State is not

required to prove that defendant knew of his right to refuse to
consent in order to show voluntariness.

jEd. See United States

v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (extending Schneckloth rule
to situation where consent was obtained from defendant in
Defendant does not raise Chief Hansen's statement of his intent
to remove the car to the sally port of the correctional facility
and dismantle [it] bolt by bolt if necessary" (T. at 14-15, 2831) as coercive (T. at 13-14). However, even if defendant had
attempted to argue that Hansen's statement was coercive, at least
one other court has found similar police conduct to be noncoercive. In United States v. Long, 866 F.2d 402 (11th Cir.
1989), police requested defendant's consent to search for
counterfeit currency they suspected was buried in the yard and
stated that if he refused they would return and "dig the place
up." ]ki. at 404. Defendant consented. The court held that the
consent was voluntary, stating;
M

There is no evidence in the record of threat
or force. The officials testified that
without any request or promise on the part of
the officers, Long led the agents to a
mattress, out by an oak tree, under which
counterfeit money was buried (Supp. R. 3536). Even if the officers stated they could
come back and "dig the place up," such a
statement does not amount to coercion. Long
was free to force the agents to obtain a
search warrant and, if at that time, he did
not want "his whole place dug up," Long could
have cooperated. We agree with the district
court that the officer's search was lawful.
Id. at 405. See also United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 361
(11th Cir. 1989) (citing Long, and holding that agents statement
to defendant that they would secure the house and attempt to
obtain a warrant if he refused anything less than an
unconditional consent was not coercive).
-91-

custody); United States v. Gonzalez-Basulto, 898 F.2d 1011, 1013
(5th Cir. 1990) (defendant's awareness of his right to refuse
consent merely one of six factors considered in determining
voluntariness of consent).

See also State v. Whittenback, 621

P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (prosecution is not required to prove
that defendant knew of his right to refuse consent in order to
show consent was voluntary).

Significantly, although defendant

was not specifically informed of his right to refuse consent, he
was advised of his Miranda rights prior to the search of his
vehicle (T. at 11; P.H. at 19).

See United States v. Jones, 846

F.2d 358, 361 (6th Cir. 1988) (in finding that uneducated
defendant's consent was not voluntarily given, court noted that
police never apprised defendant of his Miranda rights or of his
right to refuse a search); United States v. Moreno, 897 F.2d 26,
33 (2nd Cir.) (fact that defendant in custody was not advised of
Miranda rights prior to search did not destroy validity of
consent "since Miranda does not require[] the conclusion that
knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensable element of a
valid consent." (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246)), cert,
denied

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 3250 (1990).

Second, a correct chronology of the facts does not to
support defendant's contention that he was illegally detained
prior to his consent to search (Br. of App. at 12, point I; 17,
point II).

In support of his argument defendant relies on his

detention at the correctional facility (Br. of App. at 12, point
I; 17, point II).

However, defendant was not handcuffed and

moved to the correctional facility until after after he consented
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to the search of his vehicle (T. at 14-15, 28-31, 96, 100). Even
assuming the detention was improper, it could not have had a
coercive effect on defendant's consent to search.

Furthermore,

it can reasonbly be inferred from the record that defendant was
still standing alongside Anderson's patrol car, on north Main
Street (a public area), at the time he told Hansen to "Go for it"
(T. at 11, 13-15, 28-31).
Even assuming defendant was not free to leave at the
time he granted consent to search, it would not preclude a
finding that his consent was voluntary.

Webb, 790 P.2d at 82

(fact that suspect was under arrest when her consent was given,
although one relevant factor, does not preclude a finding of
voluntary consent).

See also Moreno, 897 F.2d at 33 (person

placed in official custody is not thereby rendered incapable of
giving free and voluntary consent to a warrantless search (citing
Watson, 423 U.S. at 424-25, and United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d
73, 82 (2nd Cir. 1982)); United States v. Jackson, 901 F.2d 83,
84 (7th Cir. 1990) (that defendant was not free to leave did not
preclude finding that he voluntarily consented to search); United
States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 1990) (valid
consent can be given while defendant is in custody); Garcia, 890
F.2d at 360-62 (11th Cir. 1989) (arrestee's consent to search was
voluntary although there were 14 agents in and around the home
and arrestee was handcuffed).
In support of his claim that his consent was "not
specific and unequovical, '• defendant alleges that he withdrew his
consent to search when he told Chief Hansen that he did not have

permission to "dismantle" his car (Br. of App at 19; T. at 17,
g
50-51).
Howeverf Hansen interpreted defendant's statement, not
as a withdrawal of consent, but rather, as a limit on the scope
of defendant's consent (T. at 29).

Accordingly, Hansen informed

the officers searching defendant's vehicle that they were not to
"dismantle" defendant's car (T. at 18).

Hansen testified that to

him and his fellow officers, dismantle meant "to take apart with
tools," and that no tools were used in the search of defendant's
car (T. at 29).

Believing it might be necessary to dismantle the

vehicle in order to find the drugs, Hansen left the sally port to
try to obtain a warrant to "dismantle" defendant's vehicle (T. at
17).

Defendant at no time expressly asked police to stop

searching his car (T. at 18, 74-76, 97). No express threats were
made to defendant by Hansen or the four other officers conducting
the search (T. at 18, 32). Had defendant expressly requested
police to stop searching, Hansen testified that he would have
complied with that request (Ld.).
Applying the clear and convincing standard of proof set
out by this Court in Webb and Marshall, the trial court made
specific findings of fact that (1) defendant voluntarily
Alternatively, defendant asserts that his instruction to
police, not to dismantle his car, limited the scope of his
consent to search and "police acted beyond [that] restriction[]"
(Br. of App. at 20-21, point IV). However, defendant fails to
support his allegation with specific cites to the record; rather,
he merely asserts that Davis' moving aside an undamped heater
hose constituted an attempt to dismantle his car (Br. of App. at
20). The record simply fails to support defendant's allegation
that the search exceeded the scope of his consent (T. at 17-18,
29, Testimony of Hansen, discussed in body of this point; 41-43,
Testimony of Davis). Furthermore, the trial court specifically
found that the scope of the search did not exceed the scope of
defendant's consent (R. at 153; see Addendum A ) .
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consented to the search of his vehicle; (2) the scope of the
search did not exceed the limits of defendant's consent; (3)
defendant at no time withdrew his consent to search; and (4) that
if defendant had withdrawn his consent, Hansen would have called
off the search immediately:
10. Defendant David Vance Grovier did not
inform Cedar City Police Sergeant Dennis
Anderson, or any other person, no "not touch
his car" or to "have the officers stay away
from his car." On the contrary, the Court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that
David Vance Grovier never withdrew his
consent to search his vehicle, at any time,
and that the Defendant was never coerced,
threatened, or under any duress at any time
by police officers or other persons; in fact,
the Court finds from the Defendant's own
testimony that he was never threatened or
coerced at any time during the search of his
vehicle.
11. The Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence, and from direct testimony of the
peace officers that testified, that if
Defendant David Vance Grovier had made any
statement calculated to revoke his consent to
search the vehicle, they (each of the
officers) would have immediately stopped the
search. The Court further finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the Defendant never
made any statements, to any peace officer, in
the nature of "stop the search" or "don't
search anymore" of "don't touch my car" but,
rather Defendant David Vance Grovier
consented to a search of his vehicle on at
least three (3) separate and never withdrew
said consent.
12. The Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the Defendant's statements of
"someone's going to sue over this" and "these
officers better not dismantle my car" were
limiting statements made by Defendant during
the search. The Court further finds that
said limits of the search, placed on police
officers by the Defendant, were never
exceeded and, in fact, the officers did not
exceed the scope of the consent at any time.
The Court finds by clear and convincing
-9R-

evidence that Agent Davis found the
methamphetamine by looking lup under the dash
and a heater hose (undamped at either end
and containing the approximate one-third
(1/3) pound of mehtamphetamine) simply fell
away as Agent Davis moved it aside with his
hand.
13. The Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that Agent Davis did not go beyond
the scope permitted by the Defendant's
consent and did not damage the car, dismantle
the car, tear the car apart, or do anything
but merely push aside an unconnected heater
hose which contained the hidden controlled
substances.
(R. at 150-51, see Addendum A ) .
For the purposes of legal analysis, this Court must
defer to the trial court's findings of fact.

Those findings are

not to be distrubed unless they are clearly erroneous, that is,
against the clear weight of the evidence.

Webb, 790 P.2d at 82.

Applying the preponderance standard of proof as urged by the
State, the trial court's finding of voluntary consent is clearly
supported by the record.

Should this Court choose to apply the

stiffer Webb standard, the voluntariness of defendant's consent
is admittedly a closer question.

However, the trial court

applied the clear and convincing standard of proof when it
evaluated the testimony at the suppression hearing and found
defendant's consent to be voluntary, even under that strict
standard.

The record supports that conclusion as well.

Under

either standard of proof, and considering the totality of the
circumstances, this Court can conclude that the trial court's
finding of voluntary consent is not clearly erroneous.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully
submits that the order of the trial court denying defendant's
motion to suppress should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted

this

13^Siay of November, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

fakfaHAN DECKER
>sistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Loni F. Deland, Attorney for Appellant, 132 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102, this

/^Niay of November, 1990.

'OAJb^A

-27-

>fek^A_

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

H U H JUDICIAL DIST COURT

IRON COUNTY

1 L E

O

JUN 2 91990
SCOTT M. BURNS - USB #4283
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

CLERK

A/„
i^/c:ut~ 7>xin.-\i^\yDEPUTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

PETIE KAY HALE and
DAVID VANCE GROVIER,

Criminal Nos. 901901399
901901400
(Consolidated)

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on
June 19, 1990, at 1:30 p.m., at the Fifth Judicial District
Courthouse located in Parowan, Utah, pursuant to a Motion to
Suppress filed on behalf of the above-named Defendants by their
attorney of record, Loni F. DeLand, and Defendants Petie Kay Hale
and David Vance Grovier having appeared in person at said time,
together with their attorney of record, and the State of Utah
having been present and represented

by Iron County Attorney

Scott M. Burns, and the Court having reviewed the Defendants'
Motion together with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of said Motion and the Court having further reviewed a
Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities

in

Opposition

to

the

Defendants' Motion to Suppress, and the Court having thereafter
heard

testimony

and

evidence

from

nnrn AA

Cedar

City

Chief

0f

Police J* Peter Hansen, Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force
Agent Lynn Davis, Cedar City Police Sergeant Dennis Anderson,
Iron

County/Utah

State

Correctional

Facility

Officer

Gary

Bulloch, as well as having heard proffered testimony and evidence
from witnesses, and having heard testimony and evidence from
Defendant David Vance Grovier.

Moreover, the Court received a

stipulation by and between the Defendants and the State of Utah
that the Statement of Facts contained in the Memorandum prepared
by the State of Utah are accurate and correct in all respects and
shall be used as a basis for the Court to make its determination
(See a copy of said Memorandum, marked as Exhibit "A", attached
hereto

and

stipulated
evidence

incorporated
facts

from

were

the

herein by reference); moreover, the
to

be

witnesses

supplemented
called

by

during

testimony

the

and

suppression

hearing, and the Court having reviewed the stipulated

facts

contained in the Memorandum prepared by the State of Utah, and
thereafter having fully reviewed the file and heard the testimony
and

evidence, the Court now makes and enters the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows, to wit:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the stipulation of the Defendants and the State
of Utah regarding the Court's receipt of the Statement of Facts
contained in the State of Utah's Memorandum as being undisputed,
as

well

as

the

testimony

and

evidence

heard

during

the

suppression hearing, the Court finds the following facts to be
true and accurate by clear and convincing evidence:
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1.

On February 23, 1990, Officer Lynn Davis of the Cedar

City Police Department, currently assigned to the Iron/Beaver
Counties Narcotics Task Force, was at the Circuit Court complex
located in Cedar City, Utah, when he received a call on his pager
to contact a confidential informant regarding information about
the possession or sale of illegal narcotics.
2.

Agent

Davis

contacted

the

confidential

informant

(hereinafter referred to as "C.I.") regarding the information
relating to illegal drugs at approximately 10:30 a.m.
15

of

transcript

of

March

19,

1990,

preliminary

hereinafter referred to as the "transcript".)

(See page
hearing,

The conversation

Agent Davis had with the C.I. was all by telephone and lasted
approximately two to three minutes.
3.

(See transcript, p. 22.)

The C.I. informed Agent Davis that

(a) there was a

green Buick vehicle in town, (b) the persons that were driving
the vehicle had controlled substances in the vehicle and that the
vehicle was in Cedar City, Utah, (c) the license plate number of
the vehicle was 175BAT or 175BAP, (d) there were two (2) persons
in the vehicle—one male and one female, (e) the vehicle was at
the south end of town the last time the C.I. saw the vehicle, and
(f) the C.I. had observed drugs in the vehicle, said drugs
described as a white powdery or tan powdery substance.

(See

transcript, pp. 15, 16, 22-31.)
4.

Thereafter, Agent Davis relayed this information to

Cedar City Chief of Police Pete Hansen who, in

-3f\ f\ f\

A

*

^

turn, located the

subject vehicle and had one of his officers

(Sergeant Dennis

Anderson) effectuate a stop of the vehicle on Main Street in
Cedar

City#

Correctional
Sergeant

Utah,

in

front

Facility.

Dennis

of

the

Iron

County/Utah

(See transcript, pp. 33-35.)

Anderson

stopped

the

Defendants'

State
After

vehicle,

Sergeant Anderson had a discussion with Defendant David Vance
Grovier and informed him that he had been stopped because police

I

had information regarding drugs and that "the police were going
to want to search his car," and Defendant David Vance Grovier
consented to said search and informed Sergeant Anderson that lfI
don't have anything in the car" and "go ahead and search if you
want to."

Thereafter, Sergeant Anderson told Defendant David

Vance Grovier that he wanted to search and that there were other
officers coming that were going to look in the car, and Defendant
David Vance Grovier stated, again, that "he didn't have anything
and to go ahead and look."
5.

The Defendants' vehicle was stopped between 11:15 and

11:30 a.m.

(See transcript, p. 38.)

After the vehicle was

stopped, Chief Hansen approached the passenger, Defendant Petie
Kay Hale, observed Officer Kelvin Orton perform a cursory search
of her waist area for weapons, and then Chief Hansen took a
"fanny pack" (purse-type bag that wraps around the waist of a
person) from Petie Kay Hale's person, opened the same, and found
a

marijuana

pipe

inside.

(See

transcript,

pp.

36-38.)

I
Thereafter, Chief Hansen gave Defendant David Vance Grovier his
rights per miranda

(See transcript, p. 39) and informed the
+4-
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Defendant they had stopped him because they were informed he had
drugs in his car, a request was made to search the car by Chief
Hansen,

and the Defendant

transcript, p. 39.)

said, "Go ahead and

look.11

(See

Thereafter, Chief Hansen informed Defendant

David Vance Grovier that, by giving his consent to a search of
his car, he was consenting to a search of the trunk, under the
hood and engine area of the vehicle, and the entire passenger
area of the vehicle, and Defendant David Vance Grovier said he
understood the full scope of the search and that he consented to
the same.
6.

Chief Hansen then "asked him if he understood that—

or if he was allowing us, giving us consent to search his entire
car.

And he said that he was."

(See transcript, p. 39.)

Thereafter, Chief Hansen instructed Cedar City Police Officers
Ken Stapley and Ronnie Judkins to search the car for narcotics,
which they did, and after approximately twenty (20) minutes they
could not find any narcotics in the vehicle.

(See transcript,

p. 40.)
7.

At this point, Cedar City Police Chief J. Peter Hansen

testified that "I told him (Defendant David Vance Grovier) that
it was my belief that there were drugs in the car and that he
knew that there were drugs in the car.

I asked him if he would

care to make it easier on everybody and just tell us where they
were.

He denied that there were drugs in the car.

I told him it

was our intention, then, to remove the car from the street, take
it into the sally port at the correctional facility and dismantle
-5-

nnnMQ

it piece by piece until we found drugs.
(See transcript,

p. 40.)

He said, 'Go for it.'"

Chief Hansen has testified that,

thereafter, he had the vehicle moved to the sally port at the
correctional facility based upon the Defendant's consent as well
as for safety factors as the vehicle was parked at or near a
highway at a busy time.

(See transcript, p. 41.)

The distance

from the place of the initial stop, to the sally port garage area
of the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility to where the
vehicle was moved, is approximately two hundred (200) yards.
8.

The vehicle arrived at the sally port at the Iron

County/Utah

State

Correctional

Facility

at

approximately

12:00 p.m. and Agent Lynn Davis was summoned to conduct a full
search

of the vehicle at that time.

Defendant David Vance

Grovier was taken to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional
Facility,

was held

in the booking

area of the correctional

facility, and had another conversation with Chief Hansen in which
the Defendant said, "You do not have permission to dismantle my
car" (See transcript, p. 43), whereupon Chief Hansen informed the
officers "not to dismantle the car" but to continue with the
search for the narcotics.
9.

(See transcript, pp. 43-44.)

After 12:00 noon but before 1:00 p.m., Agent Lynn Davis

of the Task Force arrived at the sally port, searched the vehicle
for approximately twenty (20) minutes, and located approximately
one-third

(1/3)

methamphetamine.

pound

of

the

controlled

substance

Agent Davis located the methamphetamine in a

heater hose underneath the driver's portion of the vehicle, Agent
T6-

nnm ^o

Davis having pushed the heater hose aside to reach up under the
dash when the heater hose end fell away and revealed a brown
cloth that was folded up and stuffed in the end of the heater
hose, said item later determined to contain the approximately
one-third

(1/3) pound

of methamphetamine.

(See transcript,

pp. 9-11.)
10.

Defendant David Vance Grovier did not inform Cedar City

Police Sergeant Dennis Anderson, or any other person, to "not
touch his car" or to "have the officers stay away from his car."
On the contrary, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that David Vance Grovier never withdrew his consent to search his
vehicle, at any time, and that the Defendant was never coerced,
threatened, or under any duress at any time by police officers or
other persons; in fact, the Court finds from the Defendant's own
testimony that he was never threatened or coerced at any time
during the search of his vehicle.
11.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and

from direct testimony of the peace officers that testified, that
if

Defendant

David

Vance

Grovier

had

made

any

statement

calculated to revoke his consent to search the vehicle, they
(each of the officers) would have immediately stopped the search.
The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
Defendant never made any statements, to any peace officer, in the
nature of "stop the search" or "don't search anymore" of "don't
touch

my

car"

but,

rather,

Defendant

H7OOOlSn

David

Vance

Grovier

consented

t»'» a search

of h i s v e h i c l e

on

rtt least

three

(3)

s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s and never w i t h d r e w said t'-u ristMit .
12.

T h e Court finds b} clear ai id c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e that

t

statements of "someone's going to sue mvei

and

"these

dismantle

officers
my

d""it in»") f \
the

c a r " wer*

not

imiting

tear

up

m~

by

dun't

Defendant

as did* said limits of

placed

exceeded

i m " .mid,

statements made

s* M r""•"'"

search,

never

better

this"

police

and,

officers
t!>

by t h e D e f e n d a n t ,

were

fficers d i d n o t exceed t h e

s c o p e ""'»'" i hv ''onsont

Com t f i. ods by clear and

convincing evidence that Agent Davis found the methamphetamine by
looking up under the dash and a heater hose ( u n d a m p e d at either
end

and

cont d i a i • i< j M m

nun t.hiL'l

M|I|»M'J.X I P M U

| ' ,» '"

<J' of

|

m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e ) simply fell away as A g e n t D a v i s m o v e d it aside
v

:ia.nu *

13,
Agent

T h e Court finds by clear

Davis

did

not

beyond

-JM \i vonv t nu i nq ev .idem, * • that
the

scope

Ifpf ericlai'i! " « rnnsent a n a a i u not d a m a g e t h e
car, t e a r the car apart
unconnected

heater

0<r

^o anything bir

hose which

contained

permitted
-•

by

the

dismantle the

••>. - . pu'-di rii.'de an

the hidden

controlled

C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW
1.

T h e Court finds by clear and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e , and
or the p o l i c e

o f f i c e r s t o s t o p t h e Defendants
arrest

for

the

felony

offense

vehicle and p l a c e them
of

Unlawful

Possession

under
of

a

Controlled
cause
lead

Substance

based

a reasonable

felony

was

,ir

sa i d

id suhstanf i a 1 facts

and prudent police officer

present]

stipulated
a

upon

Methamphetamine,

- ^

committed,

and

that

information

supported

by

the

* ion irom

informant,

on many

was a green

would

to believe that a

f acts, "I

confidential

probable

who

had

supplied

occasions

him

with

* > *

reliable
•

there

t

- 3

present time,

(b) that the persons that were driving the vehicle

j

s u bstance

ied

thai,

tl*i-

175BAP,

license
1

in the vehicle at the present time, (c)

plate

number

of

that there were two
1"en> J I P. ,

1 tie

vehicle

wa

persons in the

WM

vehicle—one

(e) that tue vehicle was presently

south end of Cedar City, State of Utah, and
observed

drugs

i n the vehicle,

>r

at; the
I
l . had

said drugs described, as a white

dPi'V subsf «inc t<> h*- Linved to be methamphetamine.
2.
February
vehic

The

Court

finds

that

23,

199*

lad probable

Cedar

City

Police

cause

*

<

officers,

on

^

Defendants'

-

t tme based

upon information received from a reliable confidential

informant

regarding

Defendants' immediate possession of the controlled

substance

- tphet ain 1 ne
Court finds by clear and convincing

evidence, and

a matter of law, that Defendant David Vance Grovier consented
1 (j a

warrantless search

-

-9-

000152

- ie

.HImil thril Baul consent

to

sea

r evoked

or withdrawi , and said

consent is a recognized exception to a warrantless sean : :::!: 1.
4.

T h e Court finds bry clear - , convincing evidence, and

as a i

T

tn.iV! 1, in? ivonsen

David Vance Grovier

was unequivocal and specific and freely
and

that

said

consent

1

w a s given without

duress

express or imr>^
of

c

coercion,

is conclusion

after indulging every reasonable presumption against the

\

*. trie fundamental

evidence

tha*"

^ ^

constitutional

Uetend^ut

right

and that the
pju-'n and

WMIV^II

convincing.
5.

lii Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and

as a matter of law, that the search by Cedat (/'i*y l'"u] j \ «v i'Mirers
and Agent Davis did

exceed the scope of the consent given as
ul that, officers would search his entire

f; !"u,- Defendant

Wo;,

car

engine

(trunk #

area,

and

al 1

throughout

| i. .eiiger

compartments) and Defendant clearly consented thereto.
6.

IIK> L'IJIM

I I MIII

as a matter of. jaw, that

ill, i le ..I i in

onvincing evidence, and

lime Lime .in which the search took was

cleariy reasonable applying common sense and the ordinary human
experience

aim • IMI

'J • [nil ice o>f * >

diligently

pursued a

means of investigation that w a s likely : . confirm or dispel their
suspicions as quickly as possible under the circumstances.
7

T 1 ^^ rmirt

idence, and

as a matter
nI

search
ion

c

: v.^ Defendants "" /ehicle

cue methamphetamine
-10-

0001K3

w a s proper

and

appi< .

.nat

said

methamphetamine

should

not

be

suppressed.
8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and

as

I I he cocaine and drug paraphernalia

located
Petie Kay

i n t ht" ""l ( 111 J i f p.i, h ""

police officers
Hale was

obtained

acceptable except j on in

withoul

warrant

that no

* M r rant, less search existed (it was not

incident to arrest, the items were not <n ni
consent obtained, no hot pursuit

-w

tn

< was

lutomobile exception, no

stop and frisk
therefore

and

' I if- f r r»d/i n t

exigent circumstances),
the

items

were

seized

pursuant

to

an

lal search and the same should be suppressed as a
matter of

-

DATED this CP^f - day of

^---Ju^t-^

r

1990,

J./^HILIP EVES/
Dj^trict Court*'Judge
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